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Abstract
The publication of the pivotal state machine replication protocol PBFT laid the foundation
for a large body of BFT protocols. While many successors to PBFT have been developed, there
is no general technique to predict the performance of these protocols under realistic network
conditions such as unreliable links. In this paper, we introduce a probabilistic model for eval-
uating BFT protocols in the presence of dynamic link and crash failures. Based on modeling
techniques from communication theory, the network state of replicas is captured and used to
derive the success probability of the protocol execution. To this end, we examine the influence
of link and crash failure rates as well as the number of replicas. The model is derived from the
communication pattern, making it implementation-independent and facilitating an adaptation
to other BFT protocols. The model is validated with a simulation of PBFT and BFT-SMaRt.
Further, a comparison in protocol behavior of PBFT, Zyzzyva and SBFT is performed and
critical failure thresholds are identified.
1 Introduction
The rapidly increasing connectivity of devices, as for example envisioned by the Internet of things,
entices the development of large-scale, globally distributed systems. The European Metrology Cloud
project [33], which aims to coordinate the digital transformation of legal metrology, is a prime
example. The scale and complexity of such systems leads to a higher risk of failure and/or malicious
behavior. The demand for trust and reliability, however, remains unchanged.
A technique to offer higher fault tolerance and availability for distributed systems is state machine
replication (SMR). It requires processes to find agreement on the order of state transitions and, thus,
consensus on the system state. One of the most prominent Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols
is Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [10]. Many modern systems, including the recent
surge of blockchain applications, utilize PBFT, or a variation of it, as their core consensus algorithm,
e.g., BFT-SMaRt [4], Tendermint [7], RBFT [3], CheapBFT [18], and Hyperledger Fabric v0.6 [2].
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While many advanced BFT protocols exist, the performance impact of dynamic failures in general
and unreliable links in particular is often ignored. Many protocols, however, require that messages
arrive within a defined timespan, i.e., there is a bound on the message delay. If that bound is not met,
the performance of the protocols might deteriorate. To quantify performance, protocols are often
compared with benchmarks on either real systems or simulations. To the best of our knowledge,
there is unfortunately no technique to assess the impact of unreliable links on the performance of
BFT protocols without requiring a comprehensive implementation.
In this paper, we fill the gap and present a probabilistic modeling approach for BFT protocols
to measure the impact of dynamic link and crash failures on their performance. The model is
derived from the communication pattern and therefore transferable to many BFT protocols. It
predicts the system state assuming the so-called dynamic link failure model [26], that is, unreliable
communication links with message losses and high delays. More specifically, we assume a constant
failure probability for all links and processes, model state transitions as Bernoulli trials, and express
the resulting system state as probability density functions (PDFs). Thus, our model can provide
feedback already during the design and development phase of BFT protocols as well as support to
parametrize timeouts.
Our model validation confirms that the model accurately captures the behavior of PBFT as
well as BFT-SMaRt [4] and allows to predict the probability for successful protocol executions.
Moreover, we employ our model to Zyzzyva [19], and SBFT [16] to showcase its applicability to
other BFT protocols. To validate the approach with an independent source, we use BFT-SMaRt’s
public library [4]. The paper’s contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We develop a probabilistic model for PBFT to quantify the performance impact in the presence
of dynamic link and crash failures. Since the model is based on communication patterns, it is
implementation independent.
• We generalize our modeling approach and show that it can be applied to other BFT protocols.
• We validate the approach in a study by comparing it to a simulation of PBFT and BFT-SMaRt
and apply it to Zyzzyva and SBFT.
• We identify critical values for dynamic link failure and crash failure rates at which the previ-
ously mentioned protocols become unstable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work with a
focus on BFT modeling and failures. In Section 3, we define the system model. Next, we describe
the detailed derivation of our modeling approach for PBFT in Section 4, and present a simulation-
based model validation in Section 5. In Section 6, we use our model to reveal structural differences
between PBFT, BFT-SMaRt, Zyzzyva, and SBFT, before we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Related Work
2.1 Preliminaries
The main properties of BFT protocols are described by the notions of safety and liveness [10].
Safety indicates that the protocol satisfies serializability, i.e., it behaves like a centralized system.
Liveness, on the other hand, indicates that the system will eventually respond to requests. In order
to tolerate f faulty processes, at least 3f + 1 processes are necessary [6]. Aside from process-related
failures, the network, i.e., the communication between processes, also impacts the performance of
BFT protocols and is often overlooked.
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The network can be described as either synchronous or asynchronous. To bridge the gap between
completely synchronous/asynchronous systems, the term partially synchronous was introduced [12].
A partially synchronous system may start in an asynchronous state but will, after some unspecified
time, eventually return to a synchronous state. This captures temporary link failures, for example.
A different perspective on a partially synchronous system is to assume a network with fixed upper
bounds on message delays and processing times, where both are unknown a priori. The partially
synchronous system model is utilized by many BFT protocols, e.g., PBFT, to circumvent the FLP
impossibility [15] and guarantee liveness during the synchronous states of the system, without re-
quiring it at all times. Deterministic BFT protocols guarantee safety, even in the asynchronous
state, but require synchronous periods to guarantee liveness.
To detect Byzantine behavior, most BFT protocols utilize timeouts (and signatures). If the happy
path of a protocol fails to make progress, a sub-protocol, e.g., a view change protocol, is triggered to
recover [20]. To optimize performance, the timeout values should depend on the bounded message
delay in the synchronous periods of the network, which plays an important role for deployments [11].
In addition to message delay characteristics, some networks, e.g., wireless networks, might be sus-
ceptible to link failures, leading to message omissions or corruptions. These failures are formally
captured by the so-called dynamic link failure model [26], where the authors prove that consensus
is impossible in a synchronous system with an unbounded number of transmission failures. Schmid
et al. [27, 28] introduced a hybrid failure model to capture process and communication failures and
derived bounds on the number of failures for synchronous networks.
2.2 BFT Models
Other modeling techniques to analyze the performance of distributed systems and PBFT have pre-
viously been proposed in the literature. The framework HyPerf [17] combines model checking and
simulation techniques to evaluate BFT protocols. While model checking usually proves correctness,
their framework uses simulations to explore the possible paths in the model checker and evaluate the
performance of the protocol. The model is validated against an implementation of PBFT to predict
latencies and throughput.
A method to model PBFT with Stochastic Reward Nets (SRNs) was proposed in [32]. The
authors deployed Hyperledger Fabric v0.6, which implements PBFT, on a cluster of four nodes and
compare the collected data to the distributions of their SRNs. Afterwards, the number of nodes in
the model is scaled and evaluated regarding the mean time to consensus.
Singh et al. [30] provided a more direct approach to evaluate BFT protocols with the simulation
framework BFTSim. The framework utilizes the high-level declarative language P2 [21] to implement
three different BFT protocols [10, 19, 1]. Built upon ns-2 [24], the simulation can explore various
network conditions.
While the previously listed models and/or simulators offer the possibility to evaluate the perfor-
mance of BFT protocols, they all require comprehensive implementations of the respective protocol.
The model presented in this paper, however, is derived from the communication pattern. Moreover,
no simulations or measurements are required to employ our model; all system states can be evalu-
ated with closed-form expressions at low computational cost. Finally, the main focus of our work
is to present a model for BFT protocols that captures the impact of unreliable communication and
varying message delays, which the other models only considered as a minor aspect.
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2.3 Link and Crash Failures
In this paper, we analyze the consequences of message omissions in PBFT caused by dynamic link
failures, which also covers misconfigured timeouts. Fathollahnejad et al. [14] examined the impact
of dynamic link failures on their leader election algorithm in a traffic control system. They assume a
constant failure probability and present techniques to calculate the probability for disagreement. As
in our paper, the number of received messages of an all-to-all broadcast is modeled with Bernoulli
trials. Since their use case does not consider Byzantine failures, their protocol does not require a
consecutive collection of message quorums which is, however, implemented in most BFT protocols
and thus the main focus of the model presented in this paper.
Xu et al. presented RATCHETA [34], a consensus protocol which was designed for embedded
devices in a wireless network that might be prone to dynamic link failures. They included an eval-
uation with artificially induced packet losses, measuring the number of failing consensus instances.
RATCHETA requires a trusted subsystem that prevents a process from casting differing votes during
the same consensus instance, eliminating the possibility of equivocations. It therefore yields a 2f+1
resilience, allowing f Byzantine failures.
In addition, there is a body of literature that covers the theoretical limits of consensus pro-
tocols [29, 28, 5], which are based on a hybrid failure model [27] and therefore also capture link
failures. Existing models, however, rarely consider performance aspects resulting from unreliable
network conditions such as dynamic crash and link failures. Since all BFT protocols have a built-in
protocol to recover from crashed processes, e.g., view changes, their impact on the performance is
tied to the frequency of the recovery algorithm execution.
3 System Model
3.1 Process Model
A distributed system consists of a fixed number of n processes (we use the term process, node, and
replica interchangeably), each with a unique ID. Typically, no more than f processes are allowed to
be subject to Byzantine faults. To guarantee safety, the system requires n ≥ 3f + 1 replicas.
In order to capture diverse failure cases, e.g., congestion due to high traffic load, we introduce
the term dynamic crash failures. That is, processes can become unavailable in each phase for a
short period of time. It is assumed that every crashed process will recover almost immediately,
upholding its pre-crash state, and may thus be available in the next phase of the protocol. Since
most BFT protocols (including PBFT) are based on consecutive phases, a crashed replica will
remain inactive until the protocol-specific recovery algorithm, e.g., view-change protocol for PBFT,
has recovered crashed replicas. In this paper, crash failures are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables for all processes.
Since our model is derived from the communication pattern of the protocol, special roles such
as the primary in PBFT which follow a different communication pattern, are incorporated into the
model.
3.2 Network Model
We assume that each network node has a peer-to-peer connection to all other nodes. The network
model in this paper allows for (1) messages to be delayed indefinitely, i.e., past the configured
timeout parameter of PBFT, and (2) message omissions as well as corruptions. The former case
acknowledges BFT protocols that rely on synchronous periods to guarantee liveness and are based
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Figure 1: Modeled view on PBFT’s happy path communication pattern. Each phase is modeled via
alternating predictions for crash (Ci) and link failures (Ni).
on timeouts to detect process and/or link failures. PBFT, for example, makes use of timeouts to
detect if progress is being made and as a consequence to initiate the view-change protocol, which
elects a new primary. Messages that arrive after a configured timeout can therefore be considered as
message omissions. The same applies to invalid or corrupted messages. The resulting failure model
can be described with the dynamic link failure model, introduced in [26]. While in practice many
BFT protocols rely on other protocols to guarantee reliable communication, e.g., TCP, they should
implement means to handle lost messages due to crashed/malicious processes. We therefore assume
unidirectional links, which implies unreliable communication.
If assumptions made regarding the bound of message delays fail, i.e., the timeouts are not con-
figured appropriately, the protocol can be considered to operate in an asynchronous network with
unbounded message delays. This does not apply if an attacker is considered to have control over
the scheduling of messages, as this could easily lead to stopping a BFT protocol altogether [22]. As
with process failures, the link failures are assumed to be i.i.d. for all links.
4 Modeling PBFT
The model presented in this section offers means to evaluate PBFT in the presence of dynamic link
failures and crash failures. In particular, a performance impact assessment becomes possible. For
the sake of clarity, we provide an overview of our modeling approach and introduce our notation
first. Next, we unroll our model for various failure types step-by-step starting with dynamic crash
failures, before we incorporate dynamic link failures.
4.1 Overview
In PBFT, the happy path consists of five phases of message exchanges, as depicted in Figure 1. The
first and last phase consist of transmissions from and to the client. In the first phase, the leader
of the current view will collect and serialize client requests. This is followed by a second phase
in which the primary disseminates the requests to all other replicas in a so-called pre-prepare
message. If a replica receives and accepts a pre-prepare message, it stores that message and enters
the third phase, broadcasting prepare messages. Replicas wait for a quorum of messages, i.e., at
least 2f + 1 prepare messages which match the stored pre-prepare message. In the fourth phase
replicas broadcast commit messages to all other replicas. Finally, if a replica collects another quorum
of commit messages, which match a previously collected quorum of prepare messages, it will commit
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(and execute) the state transition. In the fifth and last phase of the protocol, replicas reply to the
client, confirming that the client’s request was executed from the replicated system.
Disregarding the client interactions, PBFT’s happy path can be reduced to three phases by
omitting the first and last phase. The remaining three phases can be summarized as a broadcast
phase and two quorum collection phases. In the following, we assume that the primary is ready
to initiate the consensus algorithm. Consequently, only the communication between the replicas is
captured in our model.
In each phase of the protocol, the communication between and the availability of replicas is
modeled as a combination of Bernoulli trials. More specifically, we model link and crash failures
in alternating rounds for each of PBFT’s phases, as depicted at the bottom of Figure 1. To this
end, we introduce random variables Ni and Ci to express the success probabilities for the respective
failure type in round i. We assume failures to be i.i.d. for all links and processes.
In a first step, only faulty nodes are modeled as crash failures in a series of interdependent
Bernoulli trials, i.e., N1 → N2 → N3. In a second step, we extend the model by incorporating link
failures. The communication is modeled along the lines of the three transmission phases C1, C2, and
C3. Combined with the node failures, our model yields an interleaving series of dependent system
states, i.e., C1 → N1 → C2 → N2 → C3 → N3.
In summary, the system state of all replicas at each protocol phase is captured by a series of
probability density functions (PDFs), each constituting the calculation of the following. Please note,
that each PDFs allows for precise prediction of the protocol behavior and can be transformed into
more common performance metrics, e.g., latency, with statistics or other models that predict the
duration of individual phases.
4.2 Notation
In Table 1, we summarize relevant probabilities, events, and random variables, which are used in
our model. For ease of comprehension, the link and crash failure distributions are now reduced
to single probabilities, i.e., pl and pc, respectively. The assumption to have identical link failure
probabilities for all links is not an uncommon practice in this field of research [13, 30, 34]. The
impact of arbitrary failure distributions on the model are explained in Section 4.5. The system state
of the protocol is modeled by calculating PDFs that describe each replica’s state. To this end, the
random variables and events listed in Table 1 are indexed according to the different phases in PBFT.
In particular, C1, C2, and C3 represent the number of replicas that received a pre-prepare message,
received a quorum of prepare messages and received a quorum of commit messages, respectively.
Additionally, the number of active replicas after each phase is described with N1, N2, and N3. Due
to the nature of the PBFT algorithm, the distributions are dependent on each other, i.e., a replica
that crashed or failed to collect the required messages will not be able to complete the happy path.
The performance of the protocol can be assessed by calculating the previously mentioned PDFs that
describe the states of each replica.
A key building block of our model are Bernoulli trials. Therefore, we use the notation B(n, p, k) =(
n
k
) · pk · (1 − p)n−k to express the probability to get exactly k successes in a Bernoulli experiment
with n trials and a success probability of p. Furthermore, we define B(n, p, [k, l]) =
l∑
i=k
B(n, p, i)
as the sum over all Bernoulli trials with at least k and up to l successes. Finally, the notations
PX(x) = P (X = x) and PX|Y (x|y) = P (X = x|Y = y) are used to abbreviate (conditional)
probabilities.
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Table 1: Model notation for PBFT.
Symbol Description Range
Probabilities
pc Probability for a crash failure. [0, 1]
pl Probability for a link failure. [0, 1]
Events
Cp Indicates a successful reception of a quorum of prepare messages at the
current primary.
Random Variables
C1 The number of replicas that have received a pre-prepare message. [0, n− 1]
N1 The number of replicas, excluding the primary, that did not crash in the
pre-prepare phase.
[0, n− 1]
C2,n The number of replicas, excluding the primary, that received a
pre-prepare message as well as collected a quorum of prepare messages.
[0, n− 1]
C2 The number of replicas that received a pre-prepare message as well as
collected a quorum of prepare messages.
[0, n]
N2 The number of replicas that did not crash in the prepare phase. [0, n]
C3 The number of replicas that have received a pre-prepare message as well
as collected a quorum of both, prepare and commit messages.
[0, n]
N3 The number of replicas that have did not crash in the commit phase and
successfully executed the algorithm.
[0, n]
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4.3 Modeling crash failures
We start by modeling one of the most prominent failures, crash failures. In particular, a crash failure
implies no participation of the crashed process in the phase in which the crash occurred. Hence,
the replica will neither receive nor send any messages. In the following, the three random variables
N1, N2, and N3 are derived for a crash failure probability pc, assuming reliable communication links.
The happy path of PBFT is initiated with the primary broadcasting a pre-prepare message
to all other replicas. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed the primary cannot crash during the
pre-prepare phase. Since the probability for a crash is uniform across all nodes, the PDF of the
still active replicas N1 is given by PN1(n1) = B(n, 1− pc, n1). The distribution of N1 describes the
number of replicas that will now broadcast prepare messages to all other replicas in the second
phase of the protocol.
Following this procedure, the distribution of active nodes in further phases is calculated condi-
tioned on the previous phase, meaning
PNi(ni) =
∑
ni−1
B(ni−1, 1− pc, ni) · PNi−1(ni−1) for i = 2, 3. (1)
Adding up the values of P (N3 ≥ 2f +1) allows to predict the success probability for the happy path
of PBFT. As replicas cannot skip a phase in PBFT, a crashed replica will not recover during the
happy path rendering dynamic crashes similar to permanent ones.
4.4 Modeling crash and link failures
We now extend our model by introducing link failures, i.e., the links are no longer considered
reliable and are subject to a link failure probability pl. The three random variables C1, C2, and C3
are introduced to model the behavior of the protocol during the three communication phases. Due
to the special behavior of the primary in the second phase, C2 is divided into the event Cp and
random variable C2,n to capture the communication of the primary and other replicas, respectively.
Assuming the dynamic link failure model, all links are subject to the same failure probability pl and
can be, as with crash failures before, described with Bernoulli trials. In the following, we therefore
start alternating between Ci and Ni (cf. Figure 1) to model the success of the message delivery and
node availability, respectively.
Calculating C1 After receiving a request from the client, the first phase is initiated with the
primary broadcasting a pre-prepare message to all other replicas. Again, we assume that the
primary cannot crash while receiving requests from a client. Since the success probability for each
message transmission is equal to 1 − pl and independent of other transmissions, the number of
successful transmissions can be calculated with a Bernoulli trial. The PDF of C1 is given by
PC1(c1) = B(n− 1, 1− pl, c1) (2)
and describes the number of replicas that have received a pre-preapre message from the primary.
Calculating N1 Given the distribution of C1, some of replicas might crash in this phase. Based
on C1, the PDF of the remaining active replicas N1 is
PN1(n1) =
n−1∑
c1=0
PN1|C1(n1 | c1) · PC1(c1) =
n−1∑
c1=0
B(c1, 1− pc, n1) · PC1(c1). (3)
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Calculating C2 The communication in the second phase is composed of two cases: (1) whether
the primary can collect 2f prepare messages (i.e., Cp), and (2) the number of non-primary replicas
that collect at least 2f + 1 prepare messages (i.e., C2,n).
The primary can only collect at least 2f prepare messages if at least 2f active replicas have
received the previous pre-prepare message, i.e., N1 ≥ 2f . In this case, at least 2f transmissions of
prepare messages of the N1 replicas have to successfully reach the primary. This can be expressed
as the sum over all favorable Bernoulli trials, i.e., all trials with at least 2f successes out of N1. The
conditional probability P (Cp |N1 = n1) for the primary to collect the prepare message is given by
P (Cp |N1 = n1) =
{
0, n1 < 2f
B(n1, 1− pl, [2f, n]) otherwise.
(4)
For a non-primary node, i.e., a replica, to advance to C2, two requirements need to be met:
(1) the replica has received a respective pre-prepare message, and (2) the replica has collected a
quorum of matching prepare messages. For a quorum, only 2f − 1 prepare messages are required,
since a replica’s own prepare message and the primary’s pre-prepare message count towards the
2f + 1 required messages. The previous requirements translate to
1. there cannot be more replicas that receive 2f − 1 prepare messages than replicas that have
previously received a pre-prepare message, i.e., C2,n ≤ N1, and
2. a replica can only receive 2f −1 prepare messages if at least 2f replicas, including itself, have
received a pre-prepare, i.e., N1 ≥ 2f .
The calculation of C2,n can thus be divided into the following cases, assuming that n1 replicas have
received a pre-prepare message. First, for n1 < 2f , no replica will be able to gather the required
quorum of prepare messages, thus, the probability for c2,n = 0 is always one. Second, if c2,n > n1,
the probability has to be zero. Finally, for all other cases, of the n1 replicas that broadcast prepare
messages, excluding the primary, the probability for c2,n replicas to receive 2f − 1 of those messages
can be modeled as another Bernoulli trial. The probability of success in that Bernoulli trial is
identical to a replica receiving at least 2f − 1 messages of the n1− 1 possible. Thus, the conditional
PDF of C2,n for n1 ≥ 2f and c2,n ≤ n1 is given by
PC2,n|N1(c2,n |n1) = B(n1, p2(n1), c2,n) (5)
with p2(n1) being the probability that a replica will receive at least 2f − 1 prepare messages, given
that n1 replicas, including the replica itself, are broadcasting that message, which implies they have
received the pre-prepare message as well. This can be calculated with another Bernoulli trial to
get 2f − 1 receptions from n1 − 1 messages of the other replicas,
p2(n1) = B(n1 − 1, 1− pl, [2f − 1, n]). (6)
Combining (4) and (5) yields the conditional PDF of C2. The calculation is split into multiple
cases as follows
PC2|N1(c2|n1) =

PC2,n|N1(0 |n1) · P (Cp |N1 = n1), c2,n = 0
PC2,n|N1(n− 1 |n1) · P (Cp |N1 = n1), c2,n = n
PC2,n|N1(c2,n |n1) · P (Cp |N1 = n1)
+PC2,n|N1(c2,n − 1 |n1) · P (Cp |N1 = n1), c2,n ≤ n1 + 1
0, otherwise.
(7)
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The final PDF of C2 is given by applying the law of total probability to (7), which yields
PC2(c2) =
n−1∑
n1=0
PC2|N1(c2 |n1) · PN1(n1). (8)
Calculating N2 As with N1 and (3), the distribution of replicas that are still active, based on C2,
is
PN2(n2) =
n∑
c2=0
B(c2, 1− pc, n2) · PC2(c2). (9)
Calculating C3 Now, let us turn to the states C3 and N3. In the third phase, the primary behaves
in the same way as every other replica, simplifying many calculations regarding the communication
as we do not need to mind so many exceptions. As with C2, there are two requirements necessary
for a replica to reach C3: (1) the replica must be in state C2 and (2) it must have received at least
2f commit messages, not counting its own. Thus, we can conclude that
1. there cannot be more replicas that have received 2f commit messages than replicas that have
reached C2, i.e., C3 ≤ C2, and
2. a replica can only receive 2f commit messages if at least 2f + 1 replicas, including itself, have
reached state C2, i.e., C2 > 2f .
Deriving C3 is similar to C2 with (5), (6), and (7). The conditional probability of C3 for c2 > 2f
and c3 ≤ c2 is accordingly
PC3|C2(c3 | c2) = B(c2, p3(c2), c3) (10)
where p3(c2) is the probability that a replica will receive at least 2f commit messages if c2 replicas,
including itself, are broadcasting that message, i.e.,
p3(c2) = B(c2 − 1, 1− pl, [2f, n]). (11)
Applying the law of total probability yields
PC3(c3) =
n∑
c2=0
PC3|C2(c3 | c2) · PC2(c2). (12)
Calculating N3 Finally, the PDF of all active nodes after the last phase is similar to (3) and (9)
PN3(n3) =
n∑
c3=0
B(c3, 1− pc, n3) · PC3(c3). (13)
Combining (2), (3), (8), (9), (12) and (13) yields the system state at any time during execution
of PBFT’s happy path. If more than 2f replicas have completed the last phase, i.e. P (N3 > 2f),
the happy path of PBFT was successful. For the system to provide liveness in regards to the current
request, only f + 1 replicas are sufficient.
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4.5 Generalization
For the sake of simplicity, we so far assumed constant failure probabilities for links and processes,
i.e., pl and pc. We also assumed in our calculations, that those probabilities be constant for each
phase of PBFT. This is not a requirement and could be expanded to reflect more sophisticated
failure models that include time-based correlations, for example, as long as they remain i.i.d. for
each phase.
Since the model is derived solely from communication patterns, it can be adapted to other BFT
protocols, which exhibit similarities to PBFT. This is facilitated by the modular design of the
model, i.e., the expression of communication phases, e.g., broadcast, quorum, as PDFs which can
be combined to describe the overall system state. To demonstrate the adaptability, we show the
application of the model to BFT-SMaRt, Zyzzyva and SBFT in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.
These adaptations showcase how the model can be applied to a variety of communication patterns,
including client interaction and the possibility to branch into a fast or slow path.
We deliberately chose to highlight the model derivation in this section, leaving the formal defi-
nition of the modular components for future work.
5 Model Validation
To verify the correctness of the model, a discrete-event simulator was written in Rust. The codebase
of the simulation is publicly available on Github1. In a first instance, the simulator implements the
happy path of PBFT for single requests without batching. The dynamic link failure model is realized
by discarding each message reception event with a configurable probability pl (except the messages
from the client). In addition, each node will miss all messages belonging to a certain communication
phase with probability pc, simulating a crash failure. The state transitions of all processes are logged,
i.e., receiving a pre-prepare, collecting a quorum of prepare and commit messages, as well as any
crashes that occurred during each phase. By doing this, we can compare the simulated state with
the predictions of our model. The simulation can easily scale to larger numbers of nodes (above 100)
since only the state transitions in the happy path are of interest and no actual SMR is implemented,
i.e., requests are not executed.
In order to validate our model with an independent source, we also deployed the Java-based public
BFT SMR library BFT-SMaRt [4] as a reference implementation. Recent work considers the library
as a stable implementation of BFT SMR [9, 25, 31]. It implements a consensus protocol [8] that bears
a high resemblance to PBFT: it utilizes epochs, an equivalent to the views in PBFT, and operates
in three phases with respective message types. For simplicity, we stick to PBFT’s terminology, when
discussing BFT-SMaRt While mostly similar, the communication pattern of BFT-SMaRt differs
from PBFT in two details, which required minor model adaptations. Firstly, nodes do not count the
primary’s pre-prepare message as a prepare message for the second phase. Secondly, nodes are
allowed to skip the second phase if a quorum of other nodes was able to complete that phase so that
at least 2f+1 commit messages are broadcast in the third phase. We describe the model adaptations
in Appendix A. To apply dynamic link and crash failures to BFT-SMaRt, artificial message omission
probabilities were implemented into the library. Accordingly, all messages associated with one of
the three phases are dropped with the probability pl and each node discards all messages of a whole
phase with probability pc. The changes necessary to implement the aforementioned failures affected
the class that is responsible for handling incoming messages only and consisted of less than 50 lines
of additional code. Since BFT-SMaRt was not implemented to cope with dynamic link failures,
1https://github.com/mani2416/bft simulation
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Figure 2: Model validation results for PBFT (a-c) and BFT-SMaRt (d-f).
the library relies on TCP to handle message omissions. Therefore, the introduced message losses
causes the library to halt during the view-change protocol. Consequently, to gather enough data
and reliably evaluate the protocol, the protocol is restarted after each request. By doing this, we
are still able to log all states and state transitions as before. The library was executed on a single
computer and up to 10 replicas and one client were instantiated to execute the requests.
Increasing the number of processes while keeping the maximum number of faulty processes con-
stant leads to an increased robustness of both protocols against link and crash failures, because
more messages are available to build a quorum while the required quorum size remains equal. We
therefore evaluate both protocols for the most interesting scenario n = 3f + 1, i.e., the minimum
number of processes required to tolerate f faulty processes.
To validate the model for a larger parameter space, we evaluated PBFT for different numbers of
processes, link failure rates, and crash failure rates. Figures 2a to 2c show the probability of a single
(representative) process to successfully reach phase N3 for different n, pl and pc, respectively. The
simulation results for 5,000 requests are plotted with 99% confidence intervals and model predictions
are depicted as crosses. Increasing the number of processes in the network can have, depending on the
number of processes and failure rates, either a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the performance.
A more detailed analysis of this behavior is given in Section 6.3. Increasing the failure rate of either
links or processes causes a constant decrease for P (N3).
The comparison between model predictions and experimental results for BFT-SMaRt are shown
in Figures 2d to 2f. Since BFT-SMaRt implements actual SMR and the execution was unstable due
to the previously mentioned halts during the view-change protocol, we executed 1,000 requests for
each parameter combination only (without batching). Figure 2d depicts the measured and by the
model predicted PDF of P (N3). The impact of link and crash failures on BFT-SMaRt is similar to
PBFT. The small deviations visible between Figures 2b and 2c and Figures 2e and 2f stem from
the algorithmic differences described above. The overall results confirm that our model predictions
for PBFT and BFT-SMaRt align accurately with the simulations and experimental results.
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6 Evaluation
6.1 Protocol stability
The all-to-all broadcast quorum collection phase in BFT protocols, i.e., for 2f + 1 processes to collect
2f out of 3f possible messages (not counting its own), is inherently resilient against link failures. A
node cannot collect a quorum if at least f + 1 out of its 3f incoming links are failing. Consequently,
even in the worst case, at least f + 1 nodes with at least f + 1 link failures, i.e. (f + 1)2 overall link
failures, are necessary for the quorum collection phase to potentially fail.
We can validate this theoretical boundary for PBFT with our model. Since the number of
processes that partake in each quorum phase is dependent on previous phases, the boundary for
each phase is calculated as
bi,stable =
((f + 1)− (n− E[Ni−1]))2
E[Ni−1](E[Ni−1]− 1) (14)
with E[Ni−1] being the expected number of nodes that are still active after the previous phase.
Depicted in Figure 3 are the predicted probabilities for P (N3) for increasing link failures (Figure 3a)
and crash failures (Figure 3b). The line labeled ”stable” marks the boundary, given by (14), past
which the average number of link failures can potentially cause the quorum phase to fail. The linear
decrease to the left of the boundary originates from the previous phases of the protocol. In Figure 3a,
the number of processes that receive the pre-prepare message in the first phase (N1) limits the
overall number of processes that can complete the protocol. Since N1 decreases linearly with the
link failure rate, so too will N2 and N3. Past the boundary, the quorum phase may fail due to the
increased number of link failures, resulting in an abrupt decline of P (N2) and P (N3). The same
behavior is visible for increasing crash failures in Figure 3b, albeit with an even steeper linear phase.
Because processes cannot recover within the happy path of PBFT, each successive phase with crash
failures will decrease the number of available nodes for further phases, leading to the steeper decline
before the boundary.
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The evaluation methodology and the respective results can be used to parametrize the protocol
to ensure that the protocol execution remains stable even for a given failure rate. Since most BFT
protocols treat delayed messages as link failures, the model can be utilized to fine-tune timeouts.
That is, for a known (or assumed) delay distribution, a timeout parameter can be translated to a
failure rate. A small timeout leads accordingly to a higher failure rate, but at the same time is
able to quickly detect (genuinely) lost messages and make progress. For instance, let us assume
that the message delay on all links can be described with a normal distribution of mean µ = 100 ms
and standard deviation σ = 10 ms. Further, we assume bstable = 0.1 for some arbitrary protocol.
The timeout that keeps the protocol in the stable region is derived by finding an upper bound,
where the integrated PDF of the delays is equal to 1 − bstable = 0.9. In our example, the timeout
should be > 87.19 ms. To conclude, our model allows to evaluate various failure scenarios and adjust
parameters accordingly.
6.2 Impact of number of processes, link, and node failures in PBFT
To better demonstrate the predictive capabilities of the model, a contour plot of P (N3) for PBFT is
provided in Figure 4, for varying link and crash failure rates. Additionally, the gradient is displayed,
derived from the operating points for different pl and pc, as they are predicted by the model. The
orientation of the arrows indicates the impact of variations in either failure rate on P (N3). The
more pronounced the horizontal component of a vector, the more dominant is the impact of crash
failures on P (N3) and the same applies to the vertical component and link failures. The contour plot
allows to quickly discern the impact of either failure rate on the protocol performance. For example,
for low link failure rates, i.e., pl < 0.05, changes in the link failure rate have mostly a negligible
impact compared to changes in the crash failure rate. However, for very low rates of crash failures
and a moderate number of link failures (pl > 0.1), the link failure rate dominates the performance
of PBFT.
Figure 4 also validates the observations made in Figure 3a. While the link failure rate is below
the boundary, i.e., the linear slope, the crash failure rate mostly dominates the impact on the
performance. For higher values of link failures, their impact increases, correlating to the steeper
decline that follows after the boundary.
The influence of process numbers for a given link failure rate on PBFT is plotted in Figure 5a.
While it is well known that most BFT protocols do not scale well with the number of processes due
to the quadratic message complexity, it generally offers means to increase stability in the presence of
dynamic link failures. In Appendix D, we show that the probability to collect a quorum for n→∞
converges to 0 or 1, depending on pl and the quorum size. We also observe a dip in P (N3), visible for
fewer nodes and failure rates between 9%–15%. The dip is caused by two effects: (1) for larger n the
variance of the binomial distribution increases, and (2) while the mean of the distribution narrows
down on a value depending on the failure rates, the number of required messages to complete the
quorum moves towards a discrete value, which is approximately 23 . As a consequence, the number
of nodes can increase the success probability of the quorum collection phase for failure rates below
a certain threshold.
6.3 Comparison between PBFT, BFT-SmaRt, Zyzzyva, and SBFT
To showcase the adaptability of our model, we applied it to Zyzzyva [19] and SBFT [16]. The
detailed adaptations to the model are listed in Appendices B and C.
An exemplary comparison of all protocols for different crash failure rates is given in Figure 5b.
Depicted are the overall success rates, i.e., for the Zyzzyva and SBFT the combination of fast and
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Figure 5: Predictions made by our model: (a) depicts the impact of number of replicas for different
link failure rates in PBFT, (b) compares the happy path success probabilities of PBFT, BFT-SMaRt,
Zyzzyva as well as SBFT and a more detailed analysis of SBFT is given with (c) and (d).
15
slow paths. To better demonstrate the capabilities of the model, the individual success probabilities
for the fast and slow path of SBFT for different link failure rates are plotted in Figures 5c and 5d.
Since SBFT allows for optional, additional replicas, denoted as c, the model allows to quickly assess
the protocol behavior for different failure rates and configurations of c. The plots show that SBFT
outperforms PBFT for increasing numbers of c and higher failure rates, while PBFT is more stable
if SBFT transitions from the fast path to the slow path.
7 Conclusion
The probabilistic predictions of the presented model were validated with implementations of PBFT
and BFT-SMaRt for various numbers of processes and dynamic link and crash failure rates. It was
demonstrated with BFT-SMaRt, Zyzzyva and SBFT, that the model can be adapted with little
effort to other communication patterns of BFT protocols. The model gives a prediction of the
distribution of process states during execution, allowing prediction of protocol behavior (e.g. how
many view changes will occur) and therefore performance evaluation. Additionally, if the message
delay statistics are known, the model can be deployed to tune the timeouts for BFT protocols,
since most protocols cannot differentiate between a delayed or an omitted message, making them
indifferent in their impact on the performance of the algorithm. The model allows to assess the
impact of crash and link failures for various operating points of a protocol to identify key boundaries
regarding protocol stability.
As was demonstrated with BFT-SMaRt, Zyzzyva and SBFT, the model can be applied to different
BFT protocols by modifying the respective equations for the distributions or adding further random
variables should the protocol consist of more phases (as is the case with SBFT). Further adaptations
are facilitated by the fact that a body of BFT protocols are derived from the core structure of PBFT
and consist of interdependent phases.
In further work, we are planning to apply the model to more BFT protocols and evaluate their
performance regarding dynamic failures. Furthermore we are exploring possibilities to extend the
model to predict more sophisticated key performance indicators, such as throughput and latency.
Lastly, we will consider adaptations to our model in order to account for correlated link failures,
e.g., as was proposed with a model by Nguyen [23].
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A Model adaptations for BFT-SMaRt
In order to accurately capture the communication pattern of BFT-SMaRt, two adaptations to the
model, compared to PBFT, are necessary. Firstly, the collection of prepare messages is not opti-
mized to count the primary’s pre-prepare as a prepare message. Secondly, in PBFT, the processes
can only successfully complete a consensus round, if they have reached all three stages of the pro-
tocol, i.e., received a pre-prepare message and collected 2f + 1 of both, prepare and commit
messages. Complementary to this, in BFT-SMaRt, a process can complete a consensus round, if it
has received a pre-prepare message and collected 2f + 1 commit messages. Since the collection of
2f +1 commit messages implies that at least f +1 processes have received 2f +1 prepare messages,
the processes can commit safely.
Applying these differences to the model results in changes to two equations: the calculation of
C2 in (7) and C3 in (10).
Second phase: The replicas send out prepare messages.
PC2|N1(c2 |n1) = B(n1 + 1, p2(n1), c2) (15)
p2(n1) = B(n1, 1− pl, [2f, n]). (16)
Third phase: The replicas send out commit messages.
PC3|N1,N2(c3 |n1, n2) =
∑
a+b=c3
B(n2, pa(n2), a) ·B(n1 + 1− n2, pb(n2), b) (17)
pa(n2) = B(n2 − 1, 1− pl, [2f, n2 − 1]) (18)
pb(n2) = B(n2, 1− pl, [2f + 1, n2]) (19)
As (17) is now conditioned on two previous phases, the calculation of the distribution has to be
adapted with
PC3(c3) =
∑
n1
∑
n2
P (C3 = c3 |N1 = n1, N2 = n2) · PN2|N1(n2 |n1) · PN1(n1) (20)
PN2|N1(n2 |n1) =
∑
c2
PN2|C2(n2 | c2)PC2|N1(c2 |n1). (21)
B Model adaptations for Zyzzyva
Zyzzyva[19] uses a primary to order requests, afterwards, the client communicates directly with the
replicas to collect either 3f + 1 (fast path) or two quorums of 2f + 1 (slow path) messages. Due
to the direct integration of the client into the communication patterns, the link and crash failure
rates are assumed to apply to the client as well. The impact of crash failures, i.e. the calculation
Ni → Ci, is identical for all phases.
First phase: the primary broadcasts a prepare to all replicas, identical to PBFT.
Second phase: the replicas respond to the client (quorum of 3f + 1 for fast path or at least 2f + 1
for slow path).
PC2|N1,fast(c2|n1) = B(1, p2,f (n1), c2) (22)
p2,f (n1) = B(n1, 1− pl, 3f + 1) (23)
PC2|N1,slow(c2|n1) = B(1, p2,s(n1), c2) (24)
p2,s(n1) = B(n1, 1− pl, [2f + 1, 3f ]) (25)
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Third phase: the client broadcasts to all replicas.
PC3|N2(c3|n2) = B(n, p3(n2), c3) (26)
p3(n2) = B(n2, 1− pl, 1) (27)
Fourth phase: the replicas respond to the client (quorum of 2f + 1).
PC4|N3(c4|n3) = B(1, p4(n3), c4) (28)
p4(n3) = B(n3, 1− pl, [2f + 1, n]) (29)
The success probabilities for the fast and slow path are P (C2 = 1) and P (C4 = 1), respectively.
C Model adaptations for SBFT
SBFT [16] combines the properties of optimistic execution, i.e. all replicas execute in a fast path,
and redundancy, i.e. additional, optional replicas. In SBFT, the network consists of 3f + 2c + 1
replicas, with c being redundant replicas. The algorithm utilizes threshold signatures to reduce the
message complexity for collecting the required quorum sizes (3f+c+1 for the fast path and 2f+c+1
for the slow path). SBFT uses a primary to order requests. The impact of crash failures, i.e. the
calculation Ni → Ci, is identical for all phases.
First phase: the primary broadcasts a prepare to all replicas, identical to PBFT.
Second phase: the replicas respond to the collectors.
PC2|N1,fast(c2|n1) = B(c+ 1, p2,f (n1), c2) (30)
p2,f (n1) = B(n1, 1− pl, [3f + c+ 1, n1]) (31)
PC2|N1,slow(c2|n1) = B(c+ 1, p2,s(n1), c2) (32)
p2,s(n1) = B(n1, 1− pl, [2f + c+ 1, 3f + c]) (33)
Third phase: the collectors broadcast to all replicas (fast and slow path identical).
PC3|N2(c3|n2) =
∑
n2+k=c3
n2 +B(n− n2, p2(n2), k) (34)
p2(n2) = B(n2, 1− pl, [1, n2]) (35)
Fourth phase: the replicas respond to the collectors (fast path end).
PC4|N3,fast(c4|n3) = B(c+ 1, p4,f (n3), c4) (36)
p4,f (n3) = B(n3, 1− pl, [f + 1, n3]) (37)
PC4|N3,slow(c4|n3) = B(c+ 1, p4,s(n3), c4) (38)
p4,s(n3) = B(n3, 1− pl, [2f + c+ 1, n3]) (39)
Fifth phase: the collectors broadcast to all replicas.
PC5|N4,N1(c5|n4, n1) =
∑
n4+k=c5
n4 +B(n1 − n4, p4(n4), k) (40)
p4(n4) = B(n4, 1− pl, [1, n4]) (41)
the conditional probability PN4|N1(n4|n1) is calculated in the same manner as (21).
Sixth phase: the replicas respond to the collectors (slow path end).
PC6|N5(c6|n5) = B(c+ 1, p6(n5), c6) (42)
p6(n5) = B(n5 − 1, 1− pl, [f, n5 − 1]) (43)
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D Convergence of ’binomial quorums’
The probability of a replica to collect a quorum of k messages, if each of the n incoming messages
has an independent probability p to be omitted, can be formulated as
P (Q > k) =
n∑
i=k
B(n, 1− p, i), (44)
which, considering the complementary event, can be rewritten as
P (Q > k) =
n−k∑
i=0
B(n, p, i). (45)
The binomial distribution can be approximated with the central limit theorem, or in this case, the
De Moivre-Laplace theorem. The theorem states, that a binomial distribution B(n, p) for p 6= 0, 1
will converge to a normal distribution as n grows to infinity. The normal distribution has a mean of
µ = np and standard deviation of σ =
√
np(1− p).
The binomial distribution can thus be approximated as
B(n, p) =
(
n
k
)
· pk(1− p)k
=
1
2pip(1− p) · exp
(
− (k − np)
2
2np(1− p)
) (46)
This leads to a cumulative distribution function of
F (x) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
x− np√
2 · np(1− p)
)]
(47)
Applying this formula to ((45)) leads to
P (Q > k) = F (x = (n− k))
=
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
(n− k)− np√
2 · np(1− p)
)]
. (48)
If n grows to infinity, we get
lim
n→∞P (Q > k) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
n− k − np√
2 · np(1− p)
)]
. (49)
Of interest here are the development of the numerator and denominator in the exponential term.
The behavior of the numerator for growing n depends on the value of p and k. Considering that k,
the size of the quorum, has to be a value between 1 and n, we can substitute k with dqne, with q
being the relative size of the quorum compared to n.
lim
n→∞P (Q > k) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
n(1− q − p)√
2 · np(1− p)
)]
. (50)
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For the nominator applies
lim
n→∞n(1− q − p) =

−∞ , for p > 1− q
∞ , for p < 1− q
0 , for p = 1− q
. (51)
Meanwhile, the denominator will always converge towards infinity, albeit slower than the numerator
lim
n→∞
√
2 · np(1− p)→ √∞ (52)
Since the error function has the properties
lim
x→∞ erf(x) = 1, (53)
lim
x→−∞ erf(x) = −1, (54)
erf(0) = 0, (55)
we can conclude that
lim
n→∞P (Q > k) =
1
2 [1 + erf(−∞)] = 0, for p > 1− q
1
2 [1 + erf(∞)] = 1, for p < 1− q
1
2 [1 + erf(0)] =
1
2 , for p = 1− q
(56)
with q ≈ 23 for BFT.
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